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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SECTARIAN LITERATURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
New Mexico. The recent case of Miller v. Cooper' is concerned
with the controversial issue of the separation of Church and State
in the United States. In this case the court enjoined the dissemina-
tion of sectarian religious magazines among the pupils of the New
Mexico public schools. The decision was based on the idea that
such acts were a violation of the doctrine of separation of Church
and State. This constitutional principle of separation of Church
and State is founded on the First Amendment of the Constitution
and is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."3
In the Miller case the plaintiffs brought the action in their
capacity as taxpayers and school board members. The object of
the suit was to bar the defendants from teaching in the public
schools. Plaintiffs charged that the holding of the public school's
baccalaureate services and commencement exercises in church
buildings constituted a violation of the federal and state constitu-
tional provisions relating to the separation of Church and State.
It was further alleged that the distribution of sectarian religious
magazines to the students was a violation of constitutional pro-
visions.
The court, in refusing to bar the teachers from New Mexico
schools, disposed of the first charge dealing with the graduation
exercises by saying that this type of co-operation between Church
and State was not prohibited by the Constitution. The point was
added that church buildings are often the only places with ade-
quate facilities to handle the people who wish to attend graduation
1 ... N. M. --- , 244 P. 2d 520 (1952).
2 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 210 (1948) ; see
CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE (1951) 109.
3 U. S. CONST. AMEND. 1.
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exercises. However, the court did hold that the dissemination of
church literature was a violation of the doctrine of separation of
Church and State. The religious pamphlets in the instant case were
kept on the tables in the school room and were there for the stu-
dents to read or take home.
The Miller case brings to mind the 1952 United States Supreme
Court decision in Zorach v. Clauson,4 wherein the Court upheld a
New York "released time" program of religious instruction. In
this "released time" program a pupil, upon the written request
of his parents, is excused from his classwork for a certain
period during the day. He is then allowed to attend religious
instruction of his own choice at various centers off the school
grounds. The Court said that the "released time" program in the
Zorach case was valid because it involved "neither religious
instruction in public school classrooms nor the expenditure of
public funds." The court distinguished this case from the much
discussed McCollum case'0 in which an Illinois "released time"
program was held invalid.
The Zorach case held that religious instruction off the school
premises was permissible; so it would seem that the court in the
Miller case was on firm ground in upholding public school grad-
uation exercises in church buildings.
The dissemination of religious literature in the Miller case pre-
sents a different question. While it is true that the pupils were
not being taught courses in religion, still they were being subjected
to church teachings in the form of religious pamphlets. The
pamphlets were left on tables in the classroom, and the supply
4 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
5 Illinois ex tel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). Public
school children, whose parents signed request cards, were released from secular instruc-
tion in order that they might attend religious classes during school hours in the public
school building. Teachers and necessary materials were provided by a local interfaith
-council, subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools. At-
tendance records were kept, and pupils who did not attend the religious instruction
-were required to report for their regular studies.
[Vol. 7
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was replenished from time to time.' Still another factor militating
against allowing the literature in the classrooms was the fact that
the tracts were all published by the same denomination. Had reli-
gious pamphlets of a non-sectarian nature been available for the
school children, the court might have been disposed to treat them
as reference or library materials.' But see Mr. Justice Black's
dissent in the Zorach case to the effect that a state can no more
"aid all religions" than it can aid one.'
It appears that such preference as was present in the Miller
case would be held violative of the Constitution by the staunchest
proponents of a closer unity between Church and State.9
The decision in the Miller case is apparently in line with the
United States Supreme Court's idea that religion in any form, if
it is in the public school classroom, is a violation of the principle
of separation of Church and State.'
The "wall of separation between Church and State" may be,
as Mr. Justice Reed contends, "a figure of speech"", but it is a
wall none the less. Evidently the United States Supreme Court
feels that when it comes to religion in the public school classroom
itself, the "wall" is impregnable and such attempted religious
instruction will be struck down.
6 244 P. 2d at 521.
Evans v. Selma Union High School, 193 Cal. 54, 222 Pac. 801 (1924) (mere act
of purchasing a book for a school library held not to carry any implication of adoption
of dogma or theory therein, nor any approval of the book itself, except as a work of
literature fit for a library).
sZorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 318 (1952).
' CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 116.
10 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 315 (1952).
11 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 247 (1948).
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTE REQUIRING LICENSING OF WATCHMAKERS
Oklahoma. A county attorney sought an injunction to restrain
Wood from engaging in the practice of watchmaking without first
having obtained a license as required by the Watchmaking Act
of 1945.12 Wood demurred on the ground that the Act was uncon-
stitutional. The court in sustaining Wood's demurrer said that
such an act deprived Wood of the fruits of his own industry.
The court declared the Act to be "unreasonable, arbitrary and
discriminatory." It was held in effect that the Act was not designed
to promote the general welfare or contribute to public morals.
Such an act deprived Wood of a valuable property right without
due process of law. 8
The Act in question provided that a prospective watchmaker
must obtain a certificate from the Board of Examiners. The
applicant for a certificate had to serve a four-year apprentice-
ship or its equivalent under a licensed watchmaker and with the
watchmaker's consent before he was qualified for a certificate. 4
This decision brings to mind the question of how far the legis-
lature will be permitted to go in subjecting certain occupations
and professions to licensing provisions. It is well settled that the
"state under its police power has the right to regulate any and
all kinds of business in order to protect the public health, morals,
and welfare, subject to the restrictions of reasonable classifica-
tion."'"
The difficulty lies in picking out occupations and professions
that so affect the health, welfare, and morals of the people as to
render themselves amenable to the police power of the state. It
12 Okla. Laws 1945, c. 18; 59 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) §§ 771-782.
13 State ex rel. Whetsel, County Attorney v. Wood, ..Okla -------- 248 P. 2d 612
(1952).
14 59 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) §§ 771-782.
15 11 AM. JuR., Constitutional Law, § 284.
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appears obvious that occupations that are closely related to the
health of the public are proper subjects for regulatory legislation.
Accordingly, the state may require certain standards of training
and proficiency before granting such persons a license to operate.
Among professions said to be so closely allied to the health
and welfare of the public as to be subject to state regulation are
the specialized callings of law, medicine and surgery, chiro-
practic, dentistry, nursing, accountancy, pharmacy, architecture,
civil engineering, plumbing, and barbering.'" The welfare of the
community requires that the highest standards of ability and pro-
ficiency be demanded of those who would follow the professions
enumerated.
But what about watchmaking? Does the public welfare demand
that watchmakers be subjected to regulations similar to those
applied to barbers or pharmacists? The Oklahoma court in the
instant case pointed out that such regulations were proper when
applied to callings that were affected with a public interest, but
the court said that watchmaking was not one of these professions
so affected. The court pointed out that "while watchmaking is an
important calling, it is not such a business as affects the public
health, safety, and welfare.""
In all probability the strict requirements set out in the Watch-
making Act influenced the court in its decision. In effect the Act
provided a way whereby presently licensed watchmakers could
limit the number of future watchmakers by refusing to grant them
the four-year apprentice period required by the Act. The court
was cognizant of this fact when it said that "this provision has
the effect of placing in the hands of those holding a license
the power to limit the number of those allowed to engage in
watchmaking in Oklahoma, and clearly tends toward creating a
monopoly."'"
16 Id, § 275.
17 248 P. 2d at 615.
18 248 P. 2d at 614.
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Aside from holding the Watchmaking Act unreasonable, arbi-
trary and discriminatory, and not tending to promote the public
welfare, the court went on to say that the Act might result in
denying some citizens their inherent right to earn a livelihood in
a private field. By way of amplifying this point the court observed
that the Act prohibited a person who may be thoroughly trained
and qualified from pursuing his chosen calling. This in effect
would deprive the person of the fruits of his own labor and
would take away a valuable property right without due process
of law.
States in recent years have been prone to require licensing of
numerous professions and specialized callings. A survey of the
states in the Southwest discloses regulatory legislation in regard
to the following professions or occupations.
Arkansas has statutes dealing with accountants, attorneys, bar-
bers, chiropody, civil engineering, dentists, nurses, optometry,
osteopaths, pharmacy, physicians, surgeons and midwives, real
estate and business brokers, veterinarians, and, listed under mis-
cellaneous occupations, pawnbrokers, second-hand dealers, and
transient merchants.'9
Louisiana has statutes dealing with accountants, architects,
attorneys, barbers, cosmetic therapy, chiropody, civil engineering,
dentists, embalming and funeral directors, nurses, optometry,
osteopaths, pharmacy, physicians, surgeons and midwives, plumb-
ers, real estate and business brokers, veterinarians, watchmakers,
and, listed under miscellaneous occupations, pawnbrokers, second
hand dealers and transient merchants.20
New Mexico has statutes covering accountants, architects, attor-
neys, barbers, cosmetic therapy, chiropody, civil engineering,
dentists, embalming and funeral directors, nurses, optometry,
19 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. §§ 19-3701, 25-101, 67-1101, 71-501, -601, -1001, -1301, 72-
301, -501, .601, -701, -801, -901, -1001, -1101.
20 37 LA. STAT. ANN. (West, 1951) §§ 71, 141, 211, 341, 425, 611, 681, 704, 790, 961,
1041, 1111, 1171, 1261, 1361, 1431, 1513, 1581, 1751.
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osteopaths, pharmacy, physicians, surgeons and midwives, veter-
inarians and junk dealers.21
Oklahoma has statutes regulating accountants, architects, attor-
neys, barbers, cosmetic therapy, chiropody, civil engineering, den-
tists, embalming and funeral directors, nurses, optometry, osteo-
paths, pharmacy, physicians, surgeons and midwives, plumbers,
real estate and business brokers, veterinarians, Watchmaking, and,
listed under miscellaneous occupations, pawnbrokers, second hand
dealers and transient merchants.22
Texas has statutes dealing with accountants, architects, attor-
neys, barbers, cosmetic therapy, chiropody, civil engineering, den-
tists, embalming and funeral directors, nurses, optometry, osteo-
paths, pharmacy, physicians, surgeons and midwives, plumbers,
real estate and business brokers, veterinarians, and, listed under
miscellaneous occupations, pawnbrokers, second hand dealers and
transient merchants.2"
From the above listings it is seen that in almost all instances
the regulated profession is closely allied with the public welfare
of the community. The lists set out above are in no sense exhaus-
tive, but they do offer examples of "businesses affected with a
public interest."
It is suggested that the Oklahoma court was correct in declaring
the Watchmaking Act unconstitutional. There is not a close enough
relation between watchmaking and the public welfare to denomin-
ate the profession of watchmaking as one affected with a public
interest. The North Carolina court phrased the statement in a
most cogent manner in the case of State v. Ballance.24 This case
dealt with the constitutionality of a law requiring the licensing of
21 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. §§ 18-101, 51-201, -401, -501, -601, .701, -801, -901, -1001,
.1401, -1601, -1701, -2301, -2401, -2601.
225 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) § 1; 11 id., § 452; 21 id., § 1091; 59 id.,
§§ 1, 45.1, 61, 111, 198, 221, 331, 396, 411, 481, 551, 581, 621, 676, 771, 831.
23 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 41a, 2 49a, 304, 3271a, 4495, 4513,
4542a, 4543, 4552, 4567, 4 5 7 6a, 6146, 6243-101, 6573a, 7448. TEX. PEN. CODE (Vernon,
1948) art. 728.
24 229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731, 736 (1949).
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photographers. In holding such a law unconstitutional the court
asked this question, "Yet, who would maintain that the legislature
would promote the general welfare by requiring a mental and
moral examination preliminary to permitting individuals to en-
gage in these vocations merely because they involve knowledge
and skill?"
If a lawful business is of a beneficial character, and not dan-
gerous to the public, either directly or indirectly, police regulation
seems unwarranted and properly struck down under constitutional
guaranties. 26
Bob Price.
28 11 AM. JuR., Constitutional Law, § 285.
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